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The Role of the Administrative Law Judge
Ronnie A. Yoder*
The last time I went away from Washington to a judge's
conference, the world changed. The conference ended on September
11, 2001, with a national tragedy, a national nightmare, and a
changed world. But the role of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ),
while evolving, has remained unchanged. We - you and I - are not
engaged in what may come to be the longest, most difficult civil and
uncivil war in our history. But we are engaged in assuring
continuance of the freedom and fairness that we have fought -
through many wars - to preserve. There is no higher calling than the
preservation of freedom and fairness in the trenches of due process,
and we are in those trenches - you and I. That is why I agreed to
come today and talk about the role of the AL.
What does the law require of you but to do justice, love mercy,
and walk humbly?' That is the role of the administrative law judge.
* This article is an edited version of remarks made by Administrative Law
Judge Ronnie A. Yoder at the Annual Meeting of the National Association of
Administrative Law Judges (NAALJ) in Austin, Texas on November 7, 2001.
Judge Yoder is the Chief Administrative Law Judge of the Department of
Transportation, is a former chair of the National Conference of Administrative Law
Judges of the ABA (NCALJ) (1994-95), is on the executive committee of the
Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference (FALJC), the AU summit
coordinating committee, the FBA Judiciary Division Leadership Council, the
Board of Directors of the FBA DC Chapter, and the Board of Advisors of the
NAALJ Journal. The comments are his own and not those of the Department of
Transportation or any other organization or entity. Canon Four of the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct authorizes and encourages judges to "speak, write, lecture,
teach, and participate in other activities concerning the law, the legal system, and
the administration of justice." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4
(1990).
1. Micah 6:8.
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When I spoke to the Social Security Administration
Administrative Law Judges at their annual convention in 1997, I told
them in somewhat less historic tones that the role of the ALJ was to
"be nice, be cool, and just do it," which was my shorthand way of
saying a judge should (1) be personal/personable (i.e., courtesy
begets courtesy, so be nice); (2) be judicial and judicious (i.e., be
cool/calm and obey, apply and enforce the law); and (3) just do it;
that is, be professional, i.e., participate, learn, and do by joining and
being active in the National Association of Administrative Law
Judges (NAALJ), the FORUM of the United States Administrative
Law Judges, the National Conference of Administrative Law Judges
(NCALJ) of the American Bar Association's (ABA) Judicial
Division, the Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference
(FALJC), the Association of Administrative Law Judges, and the
American Judicature Society.
I know that I was your second choice to speak about the role of
the administrative law judge. But I do not mind being number two
behind Arthur Gladstone. When you are number two you have to try
harder. I have always had to try harder. When I was in college I was
Phi Beta Kappa, and at Virginia Law School I was twentieth in my
class and was on the Law Review. Then I went to Yale Divinity
School and they told me that my reading speed and comprehension
were not up to their standards. So they made me take an Evelyn
Wood-type remedial reading course. Now you understand why I
always had to try harder. I was the second son of a
Mennonite/Methodist art teacher. Second sons always have to try
harder. Mennonites were killed and run out of Europe because they
would not baptize babies. Mennonites had to try harder. Teachers'
sons have to try harder. My mother says she never required me to be
best; but when the report card came home, she wanted to know what
a B was. Mennonites are very closely interrelated. My father was
also my fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh cousin. I am my own fifth,
sixth, seventh, and eighth cousin. So I have to do the work of five. I
have to try harder. I went to seminary after law school. Now I am a
Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Jew. I am the only Mennonite, Methodist,
Presbyterian, Baptist, Catholic, Unitarian, card-carrying member of
B'nai B'rith. I have to try harder. After seminary I worked at
Nixon's law firm. It died several years ago. I have already outlived
a 125 year-old firm. Why? Because I have tried harder. When my
children were little, I told them that the only hope for mankind was
miscegenation. Now I have seven grandchildren - three Chinese, one
Japanese, two English, and an American. We all try harder. At the
Department of Transportation, I was Acting Chief for two and one
half years before I finally became Chief. I just had to try harder. So
what is the role of the administrative law judge - you guessed it -
you are the one who has to try harder.
When you are number two you have to try harder. ALJs are
number two - number two behind constitutional or statutory courts in
the judicial branch of federal and state governments, which normally
come to mind first when people think of judges. But being number
two is a substantial, in fact an infinite, improvement over not being
numbered at all. It is a lot better than being a zero, a naught, a
cipher, an invisible judiciary. We used to be referred to as the hidden
judiciary; 2 but you do not see that phraseology much any more.
Frankly, NAALJ, NCALJ, FALJC, AALJ, FORUM and the Federal
Bar Association have done a lot to see to it that we are no longer
invisible.
So at least we are number two; and, in fact, in terms of the impact
on individual Americans, the role of the ALJ is far closer to more
people than the constitutional judiciary. Social Security
Administration (SSA) alone adjudicates 500,000 ALJ cases in a
single year. For the vast majority of those encountering any kind of
civil adjudication, the ALJ is the face of justice for the American
people. What is the role of one who wears the face of justice? What
is the role of the AL?
I have played Kaspar in Mennotti's opera, Amahl and the Night
Visitors, several times for the Vienna Light Opera. It is a traditional
Christmas-time opera and is probably the most frequently performed
opera there is. Kaspar is a crazy king traveling through the desert
2. See Ronald G. Marquardt and Edward M. Wheat, Federal Hidden
Allocators: Administrative Law Judges and Regulatory Reform, 2 LAW & POL'Y
Q. 472 (1980); Thomas C. Mans, Selecting the 'Hidden Judiciary': How the Merit
Process Works in Choosing Administrative Law Judges (Part 1), 63 JUDICATURE 60
(1979); Thomas C. Mans, Selecting the 'Hidden Judiciary': How the Merit
Process Works in Choosing Administrative Law Judges (Part II), 63 JUDICATURE
130 (1979); Lawrence Mosher, Here Come the Administrative Law Judges, NAT'L
L.J., July 28, 1979, at 1247; Alice Klement, The Hidden Judiciary' Fights Back,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 24, 1979, at 1.
Fall 2002 The Role of the Administrative Law Judge
324 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges
looking for a child to save the world. He carries a box of jewels and
magic stones, and he sings about them to a crippled boy who is
miraculously cured of a debilitating illness. Maybe the role of the
ALJ is to cure the world of a debilitating administrative nightmare,
where people come before the power of government and want a fair
hearing before an impartial adjudicator. And how does the nightmare
end? Do they get a fair hearing before an impartial adjudicator? Or
do they get someone who has neither the power, nor the
independence, nor the integrity, nor the character, to do justice, love
mercy, and walk humbly. That is the role of the administrative law
judge.
But what is an administrative law judge? A federal
administrative law judge is an employee of a federal agency who
holds hearings for an agency, makes decisions in accordance with its
policy, is assured of tenure, decisional independence and freedom
from off-the-record agency input, and is generally considered to be
subject to the Code of Judicial Conduct in his public and private life.
I have written and spoken extensively for twenty-six years about the
role of that administrative law judge.
What is the role of the administrative law judge? In Butz v.
Economou,3 the Supreme Court said:
There can be little doubt that the role of the
modern federal hearing examiner or administrative
law judge within this framework is "functionally
comparable" to that of a judge. His powers are often,
if not generally, comparable to those of a trial judge:
He may issue subpoenas, rule on proffers of evidence,
regulate the course of the hearing, and make or
recommend decisions. More importantly, the process
of agency adjudication is currently structured so as to
assure that the hearing examiner exercises his
independent judgment on the evidence before him,
free from pressures by the parties or other officials
within the agency .... Since the securing of fair and
competent hearing personnel was viewed as "the heart
of formal administrative adjudication," the
3. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
22-2
Administrative Procedure Act contains a number of
provisions designed to guarantee the independence of
hearing examiners. They may not perform duties
inconsistent with their duties as hearing examiners.
When conducting a hearing under § 5 of the APA, a
hearing examiner is not responsible to, or subject to
the supervision or direction of, employees or agents
engaged in the performance of investigative or
prosecution functions for the agency. Nor may a
hearing examiner consult any person or party,
including other agency officials, concerning a fact at
issue in the hearing, unless on notice and opportunity
for all parties to participate ....
In light of these safeguards, we think that the risk
of an unconstitutional act by one presiding at an
agency hearing is clearly outweighed by the
importance of preserving the independent judgment of
these men and women. We therefore hold that
persons subject to these restraints and performing
adjudicatory functions within a federal agency are
entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability
for their judicial acts.4
The same rule has been applied to the state administrative judiciary. 5
One of the great riches of this country is its diversity; one of the
singular attributes of the administrative judiciary is its diversity. We
come in all shapes and sizes lawyers and non-lawyers, federal and
state, central panels and agency employees. That means that there
are a lot of different jobs that we perform. I cannot possibly tell you
what your job is. However, I would like to suggest three topics for
considering the role of the administrative law judge: The Codes of
Judicial Conduct and two recent resolutions of the American Bar
Association.
4. Id. at 513-14 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
5. See Robinson v. Langdon, 970 S.W.2d 292, 295-6 (Ark. 1998); Harrison v.
Coffman, 35 F. Supp. 2d 722, 724 (E.D. Ark. 1999).
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A. Codes of Conduct
I know that you had a presentation on Monday about Codes of
Conduct for ALJs, and I do not want to repeat that ground. But
usually those presentations focus on what a judge should do; and I
want to stress that the Codes also describe what an ALJ is.
Why do I say Codes? Because the American Bar Association
(ABA) has an official Model Code of Judicial Conduct which can be
adapted and adopted, and has been adopted in some form by almost
every court of general jurisdiction. The National Conference of
Administrative Law Judges of the ABA and NAALJ have endorsed
two other Codes: one for federal ALJs and one for state ALJs. At a
recent FALJC meeting, a question arose concerning judicial ethics,
and I explained that federal ALJs are in the peculiar position of
having had no specific code adopted for many of them, and
consequently we have to comply with all of them. We have to try
harder. You may have the same problem.
Normally, a Code of Conduct applies because it has been adopted
by statute or an appropriate adjudicatory body, but you should know
that it may also be applied to your proceedings on review by the
courts to determine whether due process has been accorded the
litigants in the proceedings before you.6 A Code has never been
adopted formally for most federal ALJs, but the Merit Systems
Protection Board has applied the Code in determining "good cause"
for discipline under the APA.7 Some may also have disciplinary
6. See Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238 (1980) ("An administrative law judge
(ALJ) has the right and duty to ensure due process in administrative proceedings by
controlling the conduct of those participating in those proceedings. At the federal
level, the Supreme Court has recognized that the ALJ's 'impartiality serves as the
ultimate guarantee of fair and meaningful proceedings in our constitutional
regime."') Id. at 250; Fremont Indem. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 153
Cal. App. 3d 965 (1984) (reversing the decision of a "workers' compensation
judge" who instigated ex parte communications with a witness in violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct); Green v. State, 729 S.W.2d 17 (Ark. 1987) (finding
reversible error where the judge, who served as prosecuting attorney at the time a
felony conviction was entered, did not disqualify himself under Canon 3 of the
Code of Conduct when presiding over a later proceeding to revoke a suspended
imposition of the sentence in the earlier case).
7. In re Chocallo, 2 M.S.P.B. 23 (1978), aff'd, 2 M.S.P.B. 20 (1980), and aff'd
in part, vacated and remanded in part on other grounds sub nom. Chocallo v.
boards or proceedings where codes of conduct may be applied in
determining whether your conduct is satisfactory or appropriate.
So it is important for you to know about codes of conduct in
order to know what conduct is expected of you. It is also important
to know codes of conduct in order to understand the role of the
administrative law judge, and to know who you are. What does the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct say about the role of the
administrative law judge?8 Let's look at just three concepts and
Canons:
1. An ALJ is an independent decision-maker. 9
2. An ALJ is a role model.' 0
3. An ALJ balances his public and private roles to maintain his
independence and demonstrate his role as role model."
1. Independent Decisionmaking (Canon 1)
Canon 1 of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
"A Judge Shall Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the
Judiciary."' 2
The role of a judge is to be an independent decision-maker.
Recently that role has received reinforcement from the federal courts,
which have held that even an at-will state hearing officer is entitled to
constitutional protection of her decisional independence.' 3  In
Harrison, Judge Sachs issued a virtual emancipation proclamation
for every administrative judge, holding that a state at-will hearing
officer has a First Amendment free-speech right to decisional
independence protected by the U.S. Constitution. 14 Judge Sachs
Prokop, 673 F.2d 551 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (unpublished decision), and cert. denied,
459 U.S. 857 (1982).
8. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 1, 2, 4 (1990).
9. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (1990).
10. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1990).
11. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4 (1990).
12. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (1990).
13. Harrison v. Coffman, 35 F. Supp. 2d 722 (E.D. Ark. 1999).
14. Id. at 725-26.
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recognized that his holding was probably a case of first impression,
but he concluded that:
[C]onstitutional protection of decisional independence
. . . does seem logically and historically compelled
under the expansive view of the First Amendment that
covers academic freedom and is evidenced in other
major rulings of the Supreme Court during the past
thirty years.
*.. If grading practices of teachers may sometimes
merit First Amendment analysis, it seems almost
certain that opinion-writing by both traditional judges
and administrative law judges properly claims First
Amendment protection.
I am satisfied that since ALJs enjoy absolute
immunity for their quasi-judicial work product, that
work product has the same First Amendment
protection from retaliation against the authors as is
enjoyed by similar works produced in the judicial
branch. 15
Harrison was a state ALJ who decided workers' compensation
claims under Arkansas law.16 "Her employment was at will, but she
contend[ed that] it could not be terminated on grounds violating the
United States Constitution."' 17 She alleged a violation of her First
Amendment rights when she was fired by the Workers'
Compensation Commission, because "she exercised her free speech
right to independently and impartially decide cases before her in a
competent manner within a range of reason and without imposed or
required prejudgment, partiality or ideological bias."'18 "In effect she
alleg[ed] that her exercise of quasi-judicial independence and
impartiality, as reflected in her written opinions, caused her to be
discharged."' 9 Judge Sachs concluded:
15. Id.at 725-26 & n.6.
16. Id. at 723.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 724.
19. Id.
22-2
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Although plaintiff may have been employed in the
Executive Branch of State government, this does not
preclude treating her work as judicial or quasi-judicial,
for federal constitutional analysis...
Defendants argue . . that unidentified
opinions of an AU should not be classified as matters
of "public concern," as is supposedly universally
required for protection of employee speech ....
In the present case, it is clear that rulings by an
AU are not of parochial concern; they involve more
than the personal wishes or well-being of the author...
This case, as alleged, plainly involves quasi-
judicial "decisional independence." ...
Whether or not constitutional protection of
decisional independence can be soundly advocated as
a matter of "good government" . . . it does seem
logically and historically compelled under the
expansive view of the First Amendment that covers
academic freedom and is evidenced in other major
rulings of the Supreme Court during the past thirty
years. The protection of classroom expression within
definable limits seems on a par with constitutionally
appropriate protection of decisional independence...
Although further development of the issues may
show that this case does not ultimately turn on
whether there is a First Amendment right to decisional
independence, I am presently prepared to recognize
such a right in ruling [on] the motion to dismiss. This
may well be the first decision so holding. I am fairly
sure, given the First Amendment rights of teachers,
that judges enjoy the protection asserted by plaintiff.2"
20. Id. at 724-26 (citations omitted).
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Thirteen years before Harrison, the ABA Standing Committee on
Ethics issued the opinion that federal ALJs were judges within the
meaning of the Code of Judicial Conduct, but that the status of state
ALJs would need to be examined on a case-by-case basis. 21 Judge
Sachs in Harrison made no such nice distinctions. For Judge Sachs,
if you are held out as a judge in an adjudicative proceeding, you are
entitled to - and obliged to exercise - decisional independence as a
matter of U.S. constitutional law.
22
It remains to be seen what will come of that precedent. But in
Perry v. McGinnis, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, without citing
Harrison, held that a Michigan Administrative Law Examiner's
decisions in inmate discipline cases are protected free speech under
the First Amendment, barring the judge's dismissal for failure to
maintain a ninety (90) percent guilty rate in decided cases.23 The
court said in Perry:
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether
Perry's decisions made in inmate disciplinary hearings
constitute expression as protected by the First
Amendment. We find that they do. The Supreme
Court has long held that communicative action is
protected by the First Amendment.
This Circuit has done the same - most notably and
relevantly in Parate v. Isibor. Parate involved an
engineering professor at Tennessee State University,
Natthu Parate, who refused to alter his evaluation of a
student and was subsequently subjected to discipline
and threats of termination. Parate assigned the student
a "B" while the Dean of Tennessee State's School of
Engineering and Technology - whom the Court
suggests had a particular affinity for the student
involved because of a shared national heritage -
insisted that the student receive an "A". When Parate
21. ABA Comm. On Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Informal Op. 1522
(1986).
22. See Harrison, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 726.
23. Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597, 603 (6th Cir. 2000).
refused, the Dean disciplined Parate and threatened to
fire him.
The Court explained that because "the assignment
of a letter grade is symbolic communication intended
to send a specific message to the student, the
individual professor's communicative act" falls within
the bounds of the First Amendment. The Court then
held that the Dean's act of forcing Parate to choose
between changing the grade against his professional
judgment and keeping his job "unconstitutionally
compelled Parate's speech.24
So what about an administrative law judge? The court said:
Although Parate and the instant case involve
different sectors of the state's machinery-an
educational institution and a correctional institution-
the cases involve nearly identical communicative acts
protected by the First Amendment. In the instant case,
as in Parate, the state entrusted one of its employees
with the task of reviewing facts, evaluating a set of
circumstances, and making a decision. In Parate, the
decision was handed down in the form of a letter
grade. In the case at bar, the decisions came in the
form of guilty/not-guilty determinations. Perry's
decisions, like Parate's, are communicative acts-acts
aimed squarely at the inmates in question with the
goal of reemphasizing the parameters of acceptable
behavior in prison.
In Parate, this Court decided that the attempt to
pervert the communicative acts with discipline and
threatened termination was the essence of coerced
expression. Such compulsion in the academic realm is
certainly of concern. It is, however, particularly
unsettling in the instant case because, here, the
interference results in the heavy hand of the state's
disciplinary authority being brought to bear on
24. Id. at 603-04 (citations omitted).
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inmates who may have done nothing to deserve the
invocation of that authority.
We find that a disciplinary hearing decision, like
the assignment of a letter grade, is a communicative
act entitled to First Amendment protection.25
In Perry, the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the District
Court's dismissal of the hearing officer's complaint, directing a trial
court to determine whether the State's interest in disciplining Perry
outweighed Perry's free speech rights:
It is well established that a government employer
cannot "condition public employment on a basis that
infringes the employee's constitutionally protected
interest in freedom of expression." . . . As a logical
consequence, retaliation by a government employer
against an individual who exercises his First
Amendment rights constitutes a First Amendment
violation .... This is the case even if the employee
could have been terminated for any reason.
The Supreme Court has established a three-
pronged test for determining whether a plaintiff can
prevail on a First Amendment retaliatory discharge
claim. Under the test, commonly called the Pickering
test, the plaintiff must set forth three elements: 1) the
speech involved a matter of public concern, 2) the
interest of the employee "as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern," outweighs the
employer's interest "in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees,"
and 3) the speech was a substantial or motivating
factor in the denial of the benefit that was sought. If
the employee satisfies this test, he has established a
prima facie case. 26
In Perry, the ALJ "argue[d] that he was fair and impartial in his
disposition of disciplinary cases, and that each of his decisions was a
communicative act protected by the First Amendment. He further
25. Id. at 604.
26. Id. (citations omitted); accord Harrison, 35 F. Supp. 2d 722.
argue[d] that in disciplining and terminating him for that expression,
the MDOC infringed upon his freedom of expression."2 7 The Court
noted:
The district court assumed, arguendo, that Perry's
decisions in inmate disciplinary hearings constituted
matters of public concern, and then proceeded to base
its disposition of the case on prong two of the
Pickering test-the balancing prong. When fleshed
out, it is clear that Perry's insistence through his
decisions that he be impartial and operate within the
confines of constitutional law, constitutes speech on a
matter of public concern. When Perry conducts
hearings, he is doing so at the behest of the Michigan
legislature and is making decisions that can result in a
greater or lesser period of incarceration for an inmate.
These are intensely public matters ....
Public interest is certainly near its zenith here. In
1974, in the case of Wolff v. McDonnell, the Supreme
Court mandated the establishment of prison
disciplinary hearings, demanding that inmates be
afforded due process before being disciplined for
major misconduct . . . . "The touchstone of due
process is protection of the individual against arbitrary
action of government."zs
That is the role of the ALJ. Your role and your independence are
tied to the assurance of due process. That process is not "due," if you
are pressured in your decision making. As noted in Perry:
Here, Perry asserts that pursuant to the Supreme
Court's mandate in Wolff, he acted non-arbitrarily and
as an impartial and independent fact finder. He further
asserts that through his disciplinary hearing decisions,
made with an eye toward justice and impartiality, he
was ensuring-at least to the extent of the cases for
which he was responsible-that the MDOC was
27. Perry, 209 F.3d at 605.
28. Id. at 605-06 (citations omitted).
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operating in accordance with the law as established by
Wolff.29
"Perry allege[d] that the MDOC, however, was contravening the law
by demanding that ALEs find ninety percent of inmates appearing
before them guilty." 30 The Court held:
If hearing officers focus on finding 90% of the
defendants before them guilty, as the evidence
adduced thus far suggests, they cannot possibly be
impartial, as is required by Wolff. The prisoner whose
case merits a not-guilty finding, but whose case would
result in the eleventh not-guilty finding in one hundred
decisions, is sunk. His fate is sealed before his file is
opened. Such a system reeks of arbitrary justice,
which can only be injustice.
Because Perry's speech served to ensure that the
MDOC, an arm of the state, was operating in
accordance with the law as established in Wolff, it
concerns the most public of matters.
3
'
Nevertheless, the district court dismissed Perry's complaint:
[C]oncluding that the MDOC's interest in disciplining
ALEs outweighed Perry's right to speak on a matter of
public concern. In concluding as such, the court erred.
The court based its decision on the proposition that
the MDOC must be able to discipline its hearing
officers for their decisions in order to prevent all
ALEs from being insulated from accountability.
Nothing in the pleadings could have led the court to
such a conclusion. Such a conclusion required the
finding of facts. The district court, however, decided
against proceeding to the fact-finding stage of the
trial. It erred in doing so.
29. Perry, 209 F.3d at 606.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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Moreover, the district court struck the balance in
an impermissible manner ....
The district court asserted that "[t]he MDOC has
to be able to discipline its hearing officers for findings
and credibility determinations made in prison
misconduct hearing reports; otherwise all ALEs would
be insulated from accountability for any statements
made in that context." Thus, the district court
determined that the organizational interest at stake
was the MDOC's interest in maintaining
accountability among hearing officers. We
acknowledge that maintaining accountability is a
legitimate interest. Whether the government's interest
in maintaining accountability led to Perry's
disciplining and ultimate termination, however, is far
less clear. Perry had produced substantial evidence
suggesting that the MDOC implores its hearing
officers to find no less than 90% of the defendant's
before them guilty, and he insists that he was
disciplined and terminated because of the MDOC's
interest in ensuring guilty findings for no less than
90% of defendants.... Insistence upon a 90% guilty
rate flies in the face of due process as mandated by
Wolff, and is thus not a legitimate organizational
interest.
At the very least, the record is not thorough
enough to determine whether the MDOC's interest in
impairing Perry's First Amendment right through
discipline and termination was based on a desire to
maintain accountability or a desire to maintain a 90%
guilty rate. As such, the district court erred in
determining that the Pickering balance could only
favor the prison officials and in consequently granting
the prison officials' motion to dismiss. Therefore, the
The Role of the Administrative Law JudaeFall 2002
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issue is remanded to the district court for further
consideration in line with this opinion.
32
I've quoted a lot from Harrison and Perry. Why? Because every
word is a proclamation of your role, your rights, your freedom, and
your responsibility.
Now each case is different; and each judge here may have a
somewhat different statutory and regulatory situation, but the new
federal cases affirming a constitutional free-speech First-Amendment
right to decisional independence are the most exciting new
precedents in administrative adjudication since Butz v. Economou in
1978. 33 They should warm the heart of any hearing officer or ALJ
seeking to fulfill the mandate of Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct-to "uphold the integrity and independence of the
judiciary." 34
There are many different interpretations of what the
"independence of the judiciary" means. Some may recall a spirited
debate between my good friend John Hardwicke and I on the subject
of whether mandatory prepublication review of a judicial decision is
appropriate. I am not going to reargue that here. However, you can
read about it in Subject Matter Specialists - Yoder-Hardwicke
Dialogue: Does Mandatory Quality Assurance Oversight of ALI
Decisions Violate ALI Decisional Independence, Due Process or Ex
Parte Prohibitions?, which was published in the Journal of the
National Association of Administrative Law Judges.35 Also read
Harrison and Perry, both of which were decided after that debate and
article. Nevertheless, Canon 1 of the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct provides that the role of the administrative law judge is to be
an independent decision-maker. 36  Now the federal courts are
indicating a willingness to protect that decisional independence as a
constitutional right of the ALJ.
32. Id. at 606-08.
33. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
34. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (1990).
35. Ronnie A. Yoder & John Hardwicke, Subject Matter Specialists - Yoder-
Hardwicke Dialogue: Does Mandatory Quality Assurance Oversight of AL
Decisions Violate AL Decisional Independence, Due Process or Ex Parte
Prohibitions?, 17 J. NAT'L ASW'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 75 (Spring 1997).
36. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (1990).
2. ALJ's Role as Role Model (Canon 2)
Canon 2 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct is titled: "A
Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in
All of the Judge's Activities., 37 It provides that "[a] judge shall
respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary. 38 Canon 2's commentary states:
Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by
irresponsible or improper conduct by judges. A judge
must avoid all impropriety and appearance of
impropriety. A judge must expect to be the subject of
constant public scrutiny. A judge must therefore
accept restrictions on the judge's conduct that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and
should do so freely and willingly.
The prohibition against behaving with impropriety
or the appearance of impropriety applies to both the
professional and personal conduct of a judge. 39
So what is the role of the ALJ? To be a paragon of virtue. You
are supposed to be holier than Caesar's wife; and in the context of
some of them, that may not be especially difficult or challenging.
This includes activities in the office - judicial demeanor, civility,
diligence, scholarship and accuracy - and activities outside the
office. With regard to civility toward attorneys and other judges,
consider the Standards for Civility in Professional Conduct set forth
in the D.C. Bar Report, which was based on the Final Report of the
Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit:
The organized bar and the judiciary, in partnership
with each other, have a responsibility to promote
civility in the practice of law and the administration of
justice. Uncivil conduct of lawyers or judges impedes
the fundamental goal of resolving disputes rationally,
37. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1990).
38. Id.
39. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 cmt. (1990).
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peacefully and efficiently. Such conduct may delay or
deny justice and diminish the respect for law, which is
a cornerstone of our society and our profession.
4 °
The Seventh Circuit and the D.C. Bar set forth their commitment
to what the role of the judge requires (i.e., to be nice):
Judges' Duties to Lawyers:
34. We will be courteous, respectful, and civil to
lawyers, parties, and witnesses ....
35. We will not employ hostile, demeaning, or
humiliating words in opinions or written or oral
communications with lawyers, parties, or
witnesses.
36. We will be punctual in convening hearings,
meetings, and conferences; if delayed, we will
notify counsel as promptly as possible.
37. In scheduling hearings, meetings, and
conferences, we will be considerate of time
schedules of lawyers, parties, and witnesses and
of other courts and tribunals.
40. We will not impugn the integrity or
professionalism of any lawyer on the basis of
the clients whom or the causes which a lawyer
represents.
Judges' Duties to Each Other:
43. We will treat other judges with courtesy and
respect.
44. In written opinions and oral remarks, we will refrain from
personally attacking, disparaging, or demeaning other
judges.4'
40. Standards for Civility in Professional Conduct, D.C. B. REP., June 1992, at
8-9.
41. Id.
But the activities where your role requires exemplary conduct are
not just activities in the office. They cover an array of out-of-office
activities. In order to underscore those additional requirements, in
1998 the SSA ALJs Association asked me to present a talk on sexual
conduct, which I called "Ethics and the Single Judge or Single-
Minded Judge. 42
The role of the ALJ is to be the face of justice and an example of
good conduct in public and private life. Therefore, be a paragon of
virtue.
3. An ALJ Must Balance His Public and Private Roles (Canon 4)
To underscore the dual role of judge as decisionmaker and
paragon of virtue, Canon 4 of the Model Code is titled: "A Judge
Shall So Conduct the Judge's Extra-Judicial Activities as to
Minimize the Risk of Conflict with Judicial Obligations. 43 For the
most part, you can be a leader, but not a lobbyist; a teacher, but not a
trustee; a judge, but not an arbitrator, mediator, or lawyer. 44
Canon 4 of the Model Code provides:
A. Extra-Judicial Activities in General.
A judge shall conduct all of the judge's extra-
judicial activities so that they do not:
(1) cast reasonable doubt on the judge's
capacity to act impartially as a judge;
(2) demean the judicial office; or
(3) interfere with the proper performance of
judicial duties. 45
Canon 3 directs the judge to "perform the duties of judicial office
impartially and diligently."4 6 This means that:
42. Ronnie A. Yoder, Speech at the Seventh National Educational Conference
for Social Security Administrative Law Judges (July 16, 1998).
43. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4 (1990).
44.Id.
45. Id.
46. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3 (1990).
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The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over
all the judge's other activities. The judge's judicial
duties include all the duties of the judge's office
prescribed by law. In the performance of these
duties[:] ...
(1) A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned
to the judge except those in which disqualification is
required.
(2) A judge shall be faithful to the law and
maintain professional competence in it. A judge shall
not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor or
fear of criticism.
(3) A judge shall require order and decorum in
proceedings before the judge.
(4) A judge shall be patient, dignified and
courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and
others with whom the judge deals in an official
capacity ....
Commentary
The duty to hear all proceedings fairly and with
patience is not inconsistent with the duty to dispose
promptly of the business of the court. Judges can be
efficient and businesslike while being patient and
deliberate.
(8) A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters
promptly, efficiently and fairly.47
So you have to do your job, but at the same time Canon 4 says
you should:
[S]peak, write, lecture, teach and participate in other
extra-judicial activities concerning the law, the legal
47. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3, 3 cmt. (1990) (citations
omitted).
system, the administration of justice and non-legal
subjects ....
Commentary
As a judicial officer and [a] person specially
learned in the law, a judge is in a unique position to
contribute to the improvement of the law, the legal
system, and the administration of justice, including
revision of substantive and procedural law and
improvement of criminal and juvenile justice. To the
extent that time permits, a judge is encouraged to do
so, either independently or through a bar association,
judicial conference or other organization dedicated to
the improvement of the law. Judges may participate in
efforts to promote the fair administration of justice, the
independence of the judiciary and the integrity of the
legal profession and may express opposition to the
persecution of lawyers and judges in other countries
because of their professional activities. 48
So do your job; do your civic duty; be a paragon of virtue. Do
justice; love mercy; walk humbly. That is all - that is your role.
In short, it is not easy to be a judge, but it is worth it. And it is
still the best job in the world.
4. One Final Word on the Application of the Code of Judicial
Conduct
You may be thinking, "Well, I am not even a lawyer, so that does
not apply to me." Wrong. The Model Code provides:
Anyone, whether or not a lawyer, who is an officer
of a judicial system . . . and who performs judicial
functions, including an officer such as a magistrate,
court commissioner, special master or referee, is a
judge within the meaning of this Code. All judges
48. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4, 4 cmt. (1990) (citations
omitted).
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shall comply with this Code except as provided below
by the Code.4 9
In regards to "a judicial system," the Code states that the:
Applicability of this Code to administrative law
judges should be determined by each adopting
jurisdiction. Administrative law judges generally are
affiliated with the executive branch of government
rather than the judicial branch and each adopting
jurisdiction should consider the unique characteristics
of particular administrative law judge positions in
adopting and adapting the code for administrative law
judges. 50
But Harrison and Perry say it does not matter. 51 It all applies to
you.
B. ABA Resolutions
I promised not to spell out the details of conduct required by the
Code of Judicial Conduct, but planned merely to stress that the role
of the ALJ is defined by the Model Code. Moreover, it is impossible
to separate that role from the dictates and definitions of the Code of
Judicial Conduct-to be an independent decision-maker and an
example of good conduct in public and private life. You may not be
surprised to find that the two ABA resolutions address some of these
same concerns.
In July 2000 and August 2001 the American Bar Association
adopted two resolutions, which bear directly on the role of the
administrative law judge. The first, Resolution 113, relates to federal
ALJs and notes that there is a proliferation of hearing officers at the
federal level who hold hearings for federal agencies and are not
ALJs.52 The Resolution further states that there is no rational
distinction made by the Congress in deciding when to use federal
49. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Cannon 5 (1990) (citations omitted).
50. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Cannon 5, n.3 (1990) (citations
omitted).
51. Harrison, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 724; Perry, 209 F.3d at 604.
52. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Resolution 113 (2000).
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ALJs and when to use other types of hearing officers.53 The
Resolution calls on the Congress to consider certain key factors in
deciding when to invoke the highest level of administrative due
process and provide for ALJ hearings in future statutes calling for a
hearing. That Resolution stated that Congress should consider
mandating APA hearings where:
A. The adjudication is likely to involve (a) substantial
impact on personal liberties or freedom; (b) orders that
involve a finding of criminal-like culpability; (c)
imposition of sanctions with substantial economic
effect on a party or interested person; or (d)
determination of discrimination under civil rights or
analogous laws.
B. The adjudication would be similar to, or the
functional equivalent of, a current type of adjudication
in which an administrative law judge presides.
C. The adjudication would be one in which
adjudicators ought to be lawyers. 14
The Resolution also urged Congress to adopt a statute requiring APA
hearings in future statutes providing for hearings, in the absence of a
congressional determination to the contrary.55
Those of you in state systems may wonder about the applicability
of that Resolution to you. But the question of determining the type of
administrative adjudication at the state level is very much alive:
whether to require a hearing, whether to require a hearing before a
hearing officer, whether the hearing officer should be an attorney,
whether there should be a central panel, and/or whether the particular
case should go to a central panel or stay within the agency? The
number of central panels in states has grown from only eight in 1981 to
twenty-six in 2000, largely due to the work of the NAALJ and the State
Central Panel directors in promoting that development.56 In each case
in the state system, the choice of the type of hearing, the type of hearing
officers, and the type of hearing forum presents the same questions
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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presented in the ABA Resolution, and its rationale supporting a rational
basis for decision. So when those questions arise about the type of
adjudication and adjudicator to use in the state, keep ABA Resolution
113 in mind. I don't mean use the same criteria necessarily, but use
rational criteria.
The second resolution, adopted in August 2001, calls on
Congress and the States to recognize the need for decisional
independence of administrative adjudicators and to protect that
independence by assuring that they cannot be removed from office
without a hearing under the applicable administrative procedure act.57
The resolution urges "federal, state, local, and territorial governments
to enact and adopt measures to protect the public interest in
independent, impartial, and responsible decision-making in the
administrative adjudication process." 58 It provided:
(1) that members of the administrative judiciary be
held accountable under appropriate ethical standards
adapted from the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct (1990) in light of the unique characteristics of
particular positions in the administrative judiciary; and
(2) that any individualized removal or discipline of a
member of the administrative judiciary occur only
after an opportunity for a hearing under the federal or a
state administrative procedure act before an
independent tribunal, with full right of appeal.
For purposes of this recommendation, the
administrative judiciary includes all individuals whose
exclusive role in the administrative process is to
preside and make decisions in a judicial capacity in
evidentiary proceedings, but does not include agency
heads, members of agency appellate boards, or other
officials who perform the adjudicative functions of an
agency head.5 9
57. Summary of Action Taken by the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association, 2001 A.B.A. SEC. 48.
58. Id.
59. Id.
The resolution presents three primary points to consider in
assessing the role of the administrative law judge:
1. The decisional independence of the ALJ defines his role.
2. The ALJ should comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct.
3. In order to assure the ALJ's independence, the ALJ should
be subject to discipline or removal only after a hearing on
the record before an independent ALJ.6 0
The judiciary has a high sensitivity to the independence of the
administrative judiciary, as shown by the recent decisions in
Harrison and Perry. Federal administrative law judges are very
concerned about preserving their independence and have been
working hard to do that for more than twenty-five years. The second
ABA resolution reflects the growing awareness of the state
administrative judiciary of the need to establish and preserve its
independence. 61
I have talked to a number of Congressional staffers about the first
resolution; and have found there is concern about the fact that
government agencies make rules and policies without sufficient input
from, or protection for, affected citizens. Congresspersons, as well as
local and state officials, want constituents protected, because they
want to be reelected. Our job: protect them. How can we do that?
How can we fulfill the role of the administrative law judge?
1. Know the Code of Judicial Conduct and fulfill it. If you
cannot, do not call yourself an administrative law judge.
Call yourself an administrative hearing officer, or a
presider, or even a hearing examiner, which was the old
name for ALJs under the federal APA. However, do not
call yourself a judge if you do not want to be, or they
will not let you be. Nonetheless, it does not matter what
they call you. If you are an ALJ, be a judge and comply
with the Code.
2. Teach. The Codes say we have to, if we can. Recently,
I spoke to three different groups of lawyers (the NTSB
Bar, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
60. Id.
61. Id.
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lawyers, and the DOT attorneys in the Transportation
Law Network). I gave them some general guides to
help them understand the role of the ALJ. You might
pass these along to the people who appear before you:
a. Pretend the judge deserves respect and do not
let him know you are pretending.
b. When the judge is speaking, do not talk. He
can't hear you and would probably rather hear
himself talk anyway.
c. When the judge gives you a win, do not
continue to argue. You may convince him to
change his mind.
d. Argue before the Judge; do not argue with the
Judge.
e. Be prepared-assume the judge will be.
Assume that if you miss something, the judge
will not. Assume that you should know all the
facts and law.
f. Do not expect the judge's law clerk to try your
case, do your research, or practice law-
substantive inquiries or substantive procedural
inquiries will be referred to the Judge. Do not
call the clerk and ask him not to tell the Judge.
He will. Remember, he is subject to the same
Code of Conduct provisions as the Judge.
2. Study. If you do not feel the call to teach, look at the
available books on the role of the ALJ. Start with
Manual on Administrative Law Judges62 and see my
cites in footnotes 282-84. If you are concerned about the
peculiar problems of ALJs in dealing with misconduct
by parties and lawyers, look at Judicial Response to
Misconduct in Administrative Adjudication published by
62. MORELL E. MULLINS, MANUEL ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (3d. ed.
1993).
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the Center for Professional Responsibility in 1995.63
Look at Chapter VIII, which deals specifically with
"The Judicial Role in Identifying and Referring
Misconduct in Administrative Proceedings." 64 Above
all, read Harrison65 and Perry.
66
3. Meet with Congress and local and state officials to
promote adoption of the ABA resolutions and other
provisions promoting the independence of the
administrative judiciary.
4. Monitor new legislation. Every day there seems to be a
new legal challenge to the status and independence of the
administrative judiciary. I've been an ALJ for twenty-six
years, and there has never been a time when I have not
had to defend the APA process. When I started in 1976,
the Civil Service Reform Act proposed to take away
ALJs' unlimited terms and subject them to evaluation.67
We stopped those proposals, but they were again reflected
in the study of The Federal Administrative Judiciary by
the Administrative Conference of the United States in
1992.68 There were a lot of negative things in the ACUS
study about the role of the federal ALJ.69 Some even
suggest that those negatives may have contributed to its
untimely and early demise. But that was also the genesis
of the rationalizing-ALJ-use resolution; and it only took a
decade to get it adopted by ABA.
5. You can be a part of the march toward administrative
justice. You can join NAALJ and keep up the
wonderful work that it has been doing to advance the
63. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO MISCONDUCT
(1995).
64. Id. at 114.
65. Harrison, 35 F. Supp. 2d 722.
66. Perry, 209 F.3d 597.
67. See generally, Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92
Stat. 1111 (codified as amended in scattered section of 5 U.S.C.).
68. Recommendation 92-7: The Federal Administrative Judiciary, 1992 ACUS
28.
69. See id.
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cause of the administrative judiciary. If you are an
attorney, you can self-certify financial ability, and join
the ABA for $25. You can join the Judicial Division
and either the National Conference of Administrative
Law Judges, the Special Court Judges Conference, or
the Lawyers Conference.
6. Look to the long term. Everything takes a decade. The
Model Code of Judicial Conduct for Federal ALJs took
a decade. The ABA resolution on rationalizing ALJ use
took a decade. And the work on the ALJ independence
resolution took nearly that long.
7. Remember we are number two; we have to try harder,
but it is good to be number two. We're doing a great
job, both the federal and state administrative judiciary,
because we try harder.
What is the price of freedom? What is the price of
independence? Eternal vigilance. What is the role of the
administrative law judge? That role is to protect and defend the
independence of the administrative judiciary and the integrity of the
administrative adjudication process.
So do justice, love mercy, and walk humbly. Be nice, be cool,
just do it. Do what? Try harder! Be independent. Be a paragon of
virtue. Be the face of justice and of legality for the public. Why?
Because you are administrative law judges, and that is your role.
